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University of Notre Dame
In this paper I will present some statistics that attempt to relate col-
legiate athletics to finances and academics.  I will not attempt to delin-
eate the absolute relationship between athletic and financial success.
My goal is more modest.  I will be presenting instead some “data sug-
gestions” that hopefully leave you with more questions than you came
with.
Most of the data that I will present come from information released
under the Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act (EADA), or the so-called
Gender Equity reports.  Every college that receives federal financial
assistance in any form is now required to provide information relating
to the distribution of a number of athletic variables by gender, includ-
ing the number of athletes, the amount of financial aid, operating
expenses, and implicitly, profits.  These numbers are not without com-
plexities.  Each institution has its own accounting procedures, which
typically are employed to facilitate internal decision making and not to
ensure comparability with other academic institutions.  Some of the
reported numbers are therefore potentially misleading because of these
accounting conventions.  For example, one college might include tele-
phone expenditures by the athletic department as a separate item
charged to the department.  Another might aggregate all telephone
expenditures in a general account and may not explicitly charge the
athletic department for its contribution to the overall bill.  A few col-
leges require alumni to contribute a minimum amount like $100 to the
university’s general fund in order to be eligible to purchase football
tickets.  If 20,000 alumni make this contribution, $2 million per year is
for the university’s general fund that is really football-generated reve-
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nue. These examples should not lead you to conclude that the Gender
Equity numbers cannot be trusted but rather to conclude that they must
be interpreted with care.
Table 1 contrasts the Big Ten with the Mid-American Conference
(MAC), of which Western Michigan is a member.  The top part of the
table presents a mix of statistics on enrollment, athletes, and some
expenditures.  The table is configured to present the conference aver-
ages, maximum, minimum, and the ratio of the minimum to the maxi-
mum.  The final column presents the MAC average divided by the Big
Ten average.  The ratio of the minimum to the maximum within a con-
ference yields one perspective on the degree of inequality within a con-
ference, the ratio of the MAC to the Big Ten yields a perspective on the
degree of inequality between the two conferences.
In terms of enrollment, the typical Big Ten institution is substan-
tially larger than the typical MAC school; the only exception is North-
western.  The mix of male/female students is roughly similar for the
two conferences.  Big Ten schools typically have somewhat larger ath-
letic programs.  Despite the larger number of male athletes at Big Ten
institutions, the Big Ten comes closer to meeting Title IX gender
equity guidelines.  (An institution can satisfy Title IX if its percentage
of female student-athletes is roughly comparable with its overall per-
centage of females.)  Of Big Ten scholarship athletes, 38.0 percent are
female versus only 33.1 percent of MAC scholarship athletes.  That
puts the percentage of female scholarship athletes 11.2 percent below
the percentage of female students at Big Ten schools versus 19.6 per-
cent at MAC schools.  This comparison is particularly important for an
individual school because it is one way that a school can certify that it
is in compliance with Title IX.
What causes this greater differential in MAC schools?  Certainly
alternative explanations are possible, and I would like to advance two.
First, since Big Ten schools typically are larger, one could argue that
they have access to more students to fill their athletic teams.  Thus,
reaching Title IX compliance may be easier for a larger school.  A fun-
damental problem with this explanation, however, is that most scholar-
ship athletes are recruited before they come to college, not from the
student body.  The second explanation focuses on the schools’ individ-
ual capacities for generating funds to finance Title IX compliance.
Table 1 indicates that the Big Ten generates substantial net revenue
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Table 1 The Big Ten versus the Mid-American Conference
Big Ten MAC MAC avg./
Big 10 avg.Average Maximum Minimum Min/max Average Maximum Minimum Min/max
Enrollment: Male 13,232 18,765 3,734 0.199 8,200 16,708 5,075 0.304 0.620
Female 12.628 18,230 3,870 0.212 8,701 11,470 7,026 0.613 0.689
% Female 49.2 54.4 43.3 0.796 52.8 58.1 34.2 0.589 1.072
Athletes: Male 378 470 230 0.489 294 389 227 0.584 0.780
Female 234 327 148 0.453 148 194 80 0.412 0.632
% Female 38.0 41.3 30.2 0.729 33.1 40.6 25.8 0.636 0.871
Diff.a 11.2 18.5 5.9 0.317 19.6 27.8 5.1 0.184 1.756
Student aid: Male $2,180,218 3,511,825 940,226 0.268 1,293,892 1,841,996 962,659 0.523 0.593
Female $1,335,507 2,536,923 506,501 0.200 646,408 823,056 443,458 0.539 0.484
% Female 38.0 43.3 33.5 0.774 33.4 37.5 27.6 0.737 0.880
Op. exp: BBb/men’s $480,473 1,301,433 209,106 0.161 134,848 274,546 66,404 0.242 0.281
BB/women’s $250,460 510,255 107,587 0.211 77,130 122,165 58,074 0.475 0.308
Football $1,150,187 2,984,934 337,712 0.113 375,449 679,236 143,629 0.211 0.326
Total op. exp: Men’s $2,345,423 5,068,365 971,449 0.192 716,258 1,164,957 369,786 0.317 0.305
Men’s sports 
excl. football
$1,195,239 2,083,431 633,737 0.304 340,809 485,721 226,157 0.466 0.406





Big 10 avg.Average Maximum Minimum Min/max Average Maximum Minimum
Min/
max
Recruit exp. Men $363,116 490,983 236,941 0.483 97,263 147,180 55,840 0.379 0.268
Women $127,797 176,004 70,505 0.401 32,272 64,995 20,858 0.321 0.253
Salaries Men $69,708 88,896 57,920 0.652 49,710 59,656 41,129 0.689 0.713
Women $47,032 57,467 39,946 0.695 36,231 45,281 28,550 0.631 0.770
Football Revenue $10,763,264 17,840,445 6,132,085 0.344 722,893 931,836 496,989 0.533 0.067
Expense $3,373,603 5,005,180 2,145,986 0.429 1,607,180 1,945,850 1,291,434 0.663 0.476
Net $7,389,661 15,512,024 2,665,632 0.172 (884,286) (493,397) (1,339,009) 2.714 –0.120
Men’s BB Revenue $4,551,187 6,142,915 3,044,999 0.496 268,220 513,208 115,152 0.224 0.059
Expense $1,057,599 1,777,364 683,077 0.384 452,225 594,609 324,109 0.545 0.428
Net $3,493,589 5,459,838 2,226,199 0.408 (184.005) (35,314) (325,524) 9.218 –0.053
Men’s other Revenue $569,884 2,658,212 15,202 0.006 100,668 364,455 — 0.000 0.177
Expense $2,244,463 3,329,909 1,568,489 0.471 884,143 1,411,663 537,871 0.381 0.394
Net ($1,674,579) 246,513 (2,839,902) (11.520) (783,475) (469,230) (1,298,749) 2.768 0.468
Men Revenue $17,530,360 26,017,272 12,143,588 0.467 1,158,998 1,433,468 698,288 0.487 0.066
Expense $7,626,141 12,919,483 4,820,083 0.373 2,979,663 3,437,448 2,205,850 0.642 0.391
Net $9,904,220 19,655,268 3,540,421 0.180 (1,820,666) (1,133,421) (2,328,427) 2.054 –0.184
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Women Revenue $779,356 3,064,266 24,697 0.008 37,915 78,808 780 0.010 0.049
Expense $3,440,546 4,976,973 2,542,494 0.511 1,328,315 1,657,012 846,228 0.511 0.386
Net ($2,661,190) (924,360) (4,685,316) 5.069 (1,290,401) (839,690) (1,586,915) 1.890 0.485
Overall Revenue $22,901,272 35,887,000 13,419,690 0.374 3,961,769 7,641,186 1,313,574 0.172 0.173
Expense $19,448,095 36,302,000 7,391,879 0.204 5,781,812 7,455,973 4,466,822 0.599 0.297
Net $3,413,177 18,730,905 (2,755,305) (0.147) (1,820,043) 185,213 (3,998,809) –21.590 –0.533
Revenue (%) Football 47.6 62.9 37.4 33.4 64.9 6.5
Football + BB 69.7 99.4 53.0 52.6 99.9 12.1
Cost (%) Football 17.3 13.8 29.0 27.8 26.1 28.9
Football + BB 22.7 18.7 38.3 35.6 34.1 36.2
a The “average” columns show the difference between the percentage of females enrolled and the percentage of females who are athletes.  The
“min/max” columns show the ratio of the maximum and minimum values for this difference.
b BB = basketball
80 Sheehan
from its football and men’s basketball programs and the MAC gener-
ates relatively little net revenue from these sports.  Thus, the Big Ten
has a ready source of funds for subsidizing women’s sports and com-
plying with Title IX.  One could argue that it is substantially easier for
the Big Ten to be able to afford to comply with the law.  The data do
not prove that contention, but they certainly appear to suggest it.
Following the statistics on athletes in Table 1 are statistics on stu-
dent aid, operating expenses for three sports (men’s basketball,
women’s basketball, and football), total operating expenses for men’s
and women’s sports, recruitment expenditures, and salaries.  These
numbers suggest two basic conclusions.
Looking at the last column, the MAC average is consistently a
small fraction of the Big Ten average.  The average coach’s salary in
the MAC is about 75 percent of his or her Big Ten counterpart’s.
Recruiting expenses are only 25 percent as high.  Student aid is about
50 percent of the Big Ten average, and total operating expenditures are
roughly 30 percent of the Big Ten average.  Thus, I have a very simple
question.  Does anyone believe that across the board, year-in and year-
out, the MAC can compete with the Big Ten?  The expenditure num-
bers suggest that the playing field is not level and that when MAC
schools play Big Ten schools, you should expect a mismatch.  Now one
might be tempted to argue that the discrepancy in expenses is only in
Big Ten football.  Unfortunately, that is far from the case.  MAC
expenditures for female teams are also only 30 percent of those in the
Big Ten.  You might alternately argue that higher Big Ten expenditures
reflect their greater number of athletes and, therefore, more teams.
That also is far from the case.  On a per athlete basis, MAC expendi-
tures are still less than 50 percent of Big Ten expenditures.
Why do we observe a discrepancy between Big Ten and MAC
expenditures?  There are many hypotheses.  Big Ten institutions may
have more legislative clout.  They typically have more alumni.  They
generally have longer athletic traditions.  They may place greater
emphasis on intercollegiate athletics.  Regardless of these hypotheses,
we will see in the bottom half of Table 1 that Big Ten schools definitely
generate more athletic revenue.  I will leave it to you to postulate which
reasons are more important.
The second half of Table 1 presents revenues and expenses for var-
ious sports and categories, as well as for the overall athletic program.
The Economics of Sports 81
Perhaps the most dramatic difference is in terms of football programs.
The typical MAC football program is but a shadow of the typical Big
Ten program.  It is important to note, however, that athletic expendi-
tures at the typical MAC institution are roughly 50 percent of those at a
Big Ten school, but MAC revenues are less than 10 percent of the Big
Ten average.  Why the dramatic difference?  Again, the numbers are
suggestive but not definitive.  One could argue that the marginal expen-
ditures of the Big Ten so elevate their programs that they obtain the
best athletes and coaches and can produce the best product, which is
then marketed for millions of dollars in packed stadiums.  Alterna-
tively, one could argue that the tradition of the Big Ten has elevated the
programs and generated their financial success.  Or one could argue
that the prior financial success of the Big Ten has bred a tradition that
generates further financial and on-the-field success.  In any event, the
bottom line is that Big Ten football is a very lucrative endeavor on
average, while MAC football is not.
Comparing averages in the Big Ten and the MAC, however, masks
one other important difference in the conferences.  There is much
greater variation in the Big Ten than in the MAC in terms of football
profitability.  MAC losses range from $0.5 million to $1.4 million, a
span of less than $1 million.  In contrast, Big Ten profits range from
$15.5 million to $2.7 million.  There are a few teams that dominate Big
Ten football profits: Michigan, Ohio State, and Penn State.  On a year-
in and year-out basis, these same teams are also at the top of the rank-
ings, and one might readily argue that the correlation is not an acci-
dent.  Three schools dominate Big Ten football profits and victories
while no school dominates MAC football profits (or smallest financial
losses) or victories.  It appears then that rough financial parity has pro-
duced approximate on-the-field parity as well.
For men’s basketball, the story is virtually identical to men’s foot-
ball.  The only difference is the magnitude of the numbers.  MAC
expenditures run almost 50 percent of Big Ten expenditures, but reve-
nues are less than 10 percent of the Big Ten’s.  The good news for
MAC basketball is that, on average, MAC schools almost break even.
For other men’s sports (so-called Olympic sports or nonrevenue
sports), the situation changes dramatically.  All schools in the Big Ten
and the MAC lose money on these programs; the only difference is the
magnitude of the losses.  MAC schools spend only about 40 percent of
82 Sheehan
what Big Ten schools spend.  The revenues in all cases are trivial com-
pared with the size of the athletic budget.  The good news for the MAC
is that it loses much less money in nonrevenue sports than the Big Ten.
The bad news for the MAC is that it loses less money because it spends
less, and one might reasonably project that spending less means win-
ning less.
Given the substantial financial losses shown in Table 1 for other
men’s sports, one might reasonably ask why schools spend so heavily
on these programs?  One possible answer is that the National Colle-
giate Athletic Association (NCAA) requires a school to offer a mini-
mum number of sports programs to field a Division IA football
program, but that minimum does not appear to be a binding constraint
on schools in the Big Ten or the MAC.  Why, then, do they spend?  If
they lose money and if they are not required to keep at least some of
these programs, why offer them?  The acceptance of financial loss in
these programs suggests that the entertainment value placed on them is
higher.  (One might argue that there is an educational value as well, but
that argument would be more appropriate for intramural activities than
for intercollegiate sports.)
Men’s programs (all sports combined) generally are profitable in
the Big Ten but not in the MAC.  The logic is simple.  In the Big Ten,
football profits in particular make men’s programs in general profit-
able.  In the MAC, no football profits exist to offset other losses.
For women’s sports, the story is similar to that for men’s sports
other than football and men’s basketball.  Expenses are higher in the
Big Ten than in the MAC, and revenues for both are but a fraction of
expenses.  (Women’s revenues, however, are dramatically higher in the
Big Ten.)  Once again, financial losses are lower in the MAC, but that
simply reflects the lower expenses.  Returning to Title IX, Big Ten
schools fit the model frequently advanced that football “pays the bills”
and allows schools to offer a wide-ranging women’s athletics program.
However, MAC schools dramatically contradict that model because
there are no football profits to offset other losses.  In fact, the MAC
schools face even greater difficulties in complying with Title IX.  That
is, total men’s losses average $1.9 million, and total women’s losses
are only $0.8 million.  In the case of schools with roughly 50 percent
female students, an economist might argue that the financial subsidies
to men’s and women’s programs should be approximately equal to
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meet the spirit of Title IX.  The numbers in Table 1 suggest that could
be done in alternative ways, for example, spending $1.1 million more
on women’s sports.  However, all alternatives would impose potentially
severe constraints on MAC schools because they lack financial
resources.
The last four rows in Table 1 show the percentage of total revenues
and expenses stemming from football and from football plus men’s
basketball, the two generally perceived “cash cows” of intercollegiate
athletics.  Institutional vagaries distort the maximums and minimums
here, but the averages are revealing and suggest that football and men’s
basketball do generate the majority of revenues.  However, although
football programs in particular are perceived to be “gold-plated”—get-
ting the most expensive versions of everything—the self-reported
accounting numbers suggest that football does not comprise the major-
ity of costs.  The averages suggest that football and men’s basketball do
generate the majority of revenues, but they are not responsible for a
majority of the expenditures.
Table 2 presents data from a more aggregate perspective.  Rather
than considering only the Big Ten and the MAC, Table 2 presents more
limited summary information for all Division IA schools.1  In general,
the results are consistent with those in Table 1.  Football and men’s
basketball are profitable, but other men’s sports and women’s sports









Revenue ($, millions) 6.27 2.40 0.24 0.59
Expense ($, millions) 3.26 1.02 1.28 2.42
Mean profit ($, millions) 3.01 1.38 –1.05 –1.83
Median profit ($, millions) 1.17 0.75 –0.98 –1.68
Division IA schools with a profit
Reporting profit 71 75 3 4
Actual profit 38 61 0 0
SOURCE: Gender equity reports.
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are not.  The table reports both mean and median profits, because the
distribution of football profits—and to a lesser extent the distributions
of revenues and expenditures—is not a normal or bell-shaped distribu-
tion.  A few schools make sizable profits like Michigan, Ohio State,
and Penn State in the Big Ten.  However, a small army of schools
either barely break even or lose money, like all schools in the MAC.
The mean profits of $3 million for football gives a misleading picture
of the actual profit position of the typical Division IA institution, for
which the median profit is only about $1.2 million.
Even that last number is misleading.  The EADA reports from
which these statistics are derived refer only to operating costs.  Other
costs such as debt service and administrative overhead can easily run in
excess of $1 million.  Thus, actual profits are likely much closer to zero
than reported profits at the typical institution.  For the Michigans and
Ohio States, subtracting even $2 million in omitted costs only slightly
changes the degree to which the football program is lucrative.  For
schools at the median, however, $1 million in increased costs dramati-
cally changes reported profits.
The last rows in Table 2 indicate the number of programs reporting
profits and the programs actually having profits after making adjust-
ments for accounting peculiarities, debt service, and administrative
overhead.  The EADA reports suggest that about 75 percent of the 99
schools with complete reports make a profit in both football and men’s
basketball, and almost none make a profit in other men’s programs or
in women’s programs.  After adjusting the numbers to reflect all costs,
however, the percentages with a profit drops to less than 50 percent in
football, roughly 60 percent in men’s basketball, and 0 percent in either
other men’s sports or in women’s sports.  The implication?  Institutions
that have large sports programs should receive substantial nonfinancial
utility from those programs to make the expenditures worthwhile, or
should at least believe that those programs and their publicity create
additional student applications and a larger or higher-quality student
body.
Table 2 presents a snapshot in time of the distribution of profits at
Division IA football schools.  How have profits changed over time?
Focusing on football and men’s basketball, the only programs with
profits, the growth rate in average profits from 1983 to 1996 has been
about 7.6 percent per year.  This increase appears to be substantial and
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suggests that profits might improve dramatically even at institutions
now currently suffering substantial losses.  Unfortunately, that growth
in profits has been highly uneven both over time and among institu-
tions.  In some years, profits at Division IA football schools have
grown over 20 percent, and in other years they have actually decreased.
In addition, profits at schools like Michigan have increased substan-
tially while losses at MAC schools have shown no sign of abating.
Table 3 shows mean profits by conference as well as the 11 most
profitable football and men’s basketball programs.  The numbers sug-
gest that the best conferences do very well.  The Southeastern Confer-
ence (SEC) and the Big Ten average profits of $8.6 million and $7.4
million, respectively, in football.  In basketball, the Atlantic Coast Con-
ference (ACC) joins them at the top.  Again, it should be clear that
some conferences—and by extension some schools—do very well,
while others are engaged in a continuing financial struggle.  Given the
caveats mentioned already, it would appear that the Big Ten and the
SEC as a whole are in strong shape.  The ACC, Big East, Big 12, and
Pacific–10 Conference (PAC) are generally surviving while the West-
ern Athletic, USA, and Mid-American conferences are struggling to
stay afloat.  Again, I must note that some schools in almost every con-
ference are doing well while others are not.
Table 4 presents profits of the 11 most profitable collegiate football
and men’s basketball programs.  Arguably, the rankings are suspect
because of institutional accounting inconsistencies.   However, the
results suggest certain points.  First, some schools are very financially
successful.  The table includes representatives of the PAC (1), the SEC
(5), the Big Ten (3), the Big 12 (1), and an independent.  You might
argue that Michigan or Notre Dame or Tennessee deserves to be ranked
much higher, and I would not argue with you.  Nevertheless, the point
is that the most profitable football schools generate substantial reve-
nue—even though their overall net revenues from football are rela-
tively small.  Second, looking at the list of most profitable football
schools, one cannot avoid a comparison with the more traditional top
25 rankings; in particular, every school on the list is a regular in the top
25.  Is that an accident?  I sincerely doubt it.  But the numbers—and
the presumed correlation—cannot indicate causation.  That is, does
winning generate profits?  Or does generating profits allow you to keep
on winning?  I will come back to this point shortly.
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Table 3 Mean Profits by Conferencea







Big Ten 7.39 3.49
Pacific–10 4.78 1.44
Big 12 3.46 1.26
Big East 3.09 0.81
Atlantic Coast 2.49 2.79
Western Atlantic 0.22 0.48
Conference USA –0.70 1.19
Mid-American –0.79 –0.20
a All calculations are based on all Division IA schools providing usable cost and reve-







1 Washington 20.3 Louisville 6.9
2 Florida 19.8 Arkansas 6.1
3 Auburn 16.8 Indiana 5.5
4 Penn State 15.5 North Carolina 5.4
5 Georgia 14.3 Arizona 5.3
6 Michigan 12.1 Kentucky 4.7
7 Alabama 12.1 Ohio State 4.6
8 Notre Dame 11.6 Iowa 4.1
9 Tennessee 11.3 Nebraska 4.1
10 Texas A&M 10.4 Florida State 3.8
11 Ohio State 10.2 Michigan 3.7
a All calculations are based on all Division IA schools providing usable cost and reve-
nue data in compliance with the Higher Education Act.  All data are self-reported.
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The numbers in Table 4 also agree with those in Table 1 and show
that football schools do not compete on a level field.  In fact, no school
from a “mid-major” or lower-rated conference appears on either top
ten list.  (One might argue that Louisville’s ranking at the top of the
men’s basketball list is a contradiction.  However, I would also argue
that Louisville’s ranking is likely boosted by institutional accounting
since its EADA report indicates revenues almost $600,000 more than
Kentucky’s, a similar but potentially richer program, and costs less
than 60 percent of Kentucky’s.)  Can a school other than a traditional
power crack the top 10?  The numbers suggest that it is dramatically
easier for an institution like East Carolina or UNLV to break into the
top echelon on the field than it is to break into the top tier in profits.
Let me next briefly address the question of causation.  Does win-
ning generate profits, for example?  The evidence again must be
viewed as suggestive rather than definitive.  Statistical analysis (regres-
sion) of revenues does not indicate any strong relationship.  In particu-
lar, it appears that winning more football games does not increase
revenue but that a higher poll ranking does marginally improve profits.
While that finding may appear contradictory, it should not be entirely
unexpected.  If Western Michigan and Michigan both win one addi-
tional game, will the win work to increase their revenues?  The statisti-
cal answer is probably no.  However, if Michigan is ranked slightly
higher in the polls, will the elevated ranking increase its revenues?  The
statistical answer is likely yes.  (One should also note that winning
more would mean a higher ranking, so there could be a more indirect
relationship between winning and revenues.)  It might not be possible
for Michigan to sell any additional tickets because they generally play
before a full house.  However, the school may become eligible for a
better bowl or receive additional television revenue.
In terms of causation, what may be the most interesting result is
that revenues appear to be largely driven by expenses.  Based on the
results shown in the previous tables, this interaction should come as no
surprise.  However, the question really should be about the magnitude
of the increase in revenues.  That is, if a school increases expenditures
by $1, should it expect to increase revenues by more or less than $1?
The answer to this question varies dramatically by sport.  For other
men’s and women’s sports, a $1 increase in expenditures increases rev-
enues by $0.25 to $0.35 (Sheehan 2000).  The implication?  If a school
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wants to spend more money on these programs, it should feel free to do
that, but it should not expect to earn its money back in increased reve-
nues.  For football, a $1 increase in expenditures generates approxi-
mately $1 in additional revenue (Sheehan 2000).  The implication?  If a
school wants to keep throwing money at football, on average it will be
no worse off with revenues increasing with expenditures.  Thus, any
incentive to follow this strategy must be based on a desire to win rather
than a desire to make money.
The most interesting case is men’s basketball, for which each $1
increase in expenditures is expected to produce approximately $2 in
additional revenue (Sheehan 2000).  This result may initially appear
surprising, but I contend it is quite consistent with developments in
Division I basketball.  If schools generally observe that basketball
expenditures are profitable, then they should invest in their basketball
programs.  The NCAA has myriad restrictions limiting institutions
from simply dropping buckets of money into any sports program.
However, the NCAA has few restrictions on schools adding basketball
programs.  The result?  Almost 100 institutions have moved to Division
I in basketball, arguably because they are investing in their basketball
programs.
Finally, in terms of causation, one could ask whether schools use
football revenues to subsidize other sports programs?  (I focus on foot-
ball rather than men’s basketball because few schools generate enough
net revenue from basketball to contribute appreciable subsidies to other
sports programs.)  The results suggest that higher net football revenue
is associated with higher expenses in other men’s and women’s pro-
grams.  For each $1 increase in football net revenue, regression results
suggest that other men’s expenditures rise by about $0.10 and women’s
expenditures rise by about $0.20 (Sheehan 2000).  These numbers have
two implications.  First, although the values sound very small, top pro-
grams like Penn State share substantial additional revenues with
women’s sports.  In fact, its football profits of $15.5 million give Penn
State’s women’s sports about $3 million more to spend.  Of course,
there is also a downside.  For a program like Tulane that lost $3.3 mil-
lion on football, women’s expenditures would be predicted to be down
about $0.6 million.  Second, if for each dollar of football net revenue,
$0.10 goes to other men’s sports and $0.20 goes to women’s sports,
where does the other $0.70 go?  The answer, assuming no increase in

















All students 71.1 58.6 36.0 83.6 53.0 0.745
Athletes 67.7 58.6 40.5 76.4 60.7 0.897 0.999
All students
Black/M 45.4 39.3 18.0 65.8 32.2 0.710
White/M 71.4 57.9 34.0 84.8 51.4 0.720
Total/M 69.7 56.1 32.3 82.7 50.3 0.721
Black/F 52.5 48.1 26.0 69.8 38.4 0.731
White/F 74.5 63.0 41.2 88.0 56.4 0.757
Total/F 72.6 61.1 38.6 84.7 55.1 0.759
Athletes
Black/M 49.4 43.2 23.0 67.8 43.0 0.871 1.099
White/M 66.5 57.7 40.2 75.0 59.7 0.897 0.997
Total/M 62.2 53.3 34.4 74.4 56.6 0.910 0.950
Black/F 66.8 62.5 33.0 92.0 60.3 0.902 1.300
White/F 82.0 70.1 52.4 88.0 69.6 0.849 1.112
Total/F 79.4 68.8 51.2 87.0 68.4 0.862 1.125
Football
Black 51.8 43.9 20.0 66.0 46.5 0.897 1.118
White 71.0 61.9 46.0 79.0 63.7 0.897 1.070
Total 62.0 53.1 36.0 76.0 56.8 0.916 0.948
a Values calculated using data in “Division IA average” column.
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administrative overhead, is that it would go back to the general fund of
the institution.  That is, colleges that have football profits are using
those profits to subsidize the academic enterprise.
To this point I have said very little about academics, despite the
title of this paper, which places academics first.  Table 5 presents some
statistics on graduation rates, which, although far from the only mea-
sure of academic performance, are the only readily available measure.
Table 5 presents Big Ten and MAC average graduation rates as well as
the average rates for all Division IA football schools and for the 10th
and 90th percentiles.  The table presents the graduation rates of the
general student body and of athletes by sex and race.  The last column
shows that athletes—even football players—graduate at roughly the
same rate as other students.  In general, this is good news.  (Basketball
players, however, do not graduate at the same rate as the general stu-
dent population.)  Before any congratulations are handed out to foot-
ball players and other athletes, however, a strong word of caution is in
order.  Athletes toil under substantial additional constraints because
they must spend many hours in training or in sometimes intense com-
petition.  Critics of the current grant-in-aid system label their efforts
“work” rather than athletics.  Offsetting this cost, however, are some
substantial benefits.  In particular, athletes’ grants-in-aid allow them to
be full-time students without the distraction—at least until recently—
of working to fund their tuition or board.  In addition, they frequently
have additional academic advantages, such as tutors who are not avail-
able to or are very expensive for a typical student.  Thus, one might ask
whether we should expect athletes to graduate at a higher rate than the
student body in general.
Another frequently expressed concern is that major athletic pro-
grams place more emphasis on winning than studying and thus the
most stress on student-athletes—or perhaps more accurately, on ath-
lete-students.  The results in Table 5, however, suggest that there is no
support for this concern.  If athletic competition were too stressful, we
should expect to see lower graduation rates in the Big Ten than in the
MAC.  But, although the rates are close, Big Ten athletes have gradua-
tion rates that are slightly higher than those in the MAC.  This result
should not be surprising, however, given the results already presented.
The Big Ten has dramatically more financial resources than the MAC.
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To the extent that Big Ten schools value high graduation rates, they
clearly have the ability to provide the resources to achieve that goal.
In summary, what should you conclude based on these statistics?  I
would argue that there are three general conclusions.  First, athletic
success and financial success are intimately related.  Big-time schools
with tradition and reputation may make money with their athletic pro-
grams; others do not.  Furthermore, a “have-not” school has virtually
no chance of changing (unless it cheats, but that is another story).  Sec-
ond, athletic programs generally cross-subsidize within their cam-
puses.  That is, the schools that make money can and do use those
profits to improve nonrevenue sports as well as the institution’s general
academic program.  However, the many schools with losses in their
athletic programs are effectively using revenue generated from the aca-
demic arena to subsidize sports.  There may well be a sound logic for
this subsidy, but academics should insist that it be justified explicitly.
Third, the academic enterprise is relatively insulated from the athletic
enterprise except for what is often a relatively small financial link.
Anecdotal evidence such as stories of the so-called “Flutie effect,” in
which applications double after a stunning athletic event, also link ath-
letics to academics.  However, the statistical evidence of any link is less
than overwhelming.  That should not imply that academics can safely
ignore the athletic enterprise.  It does, however, suggest that the ath-
letic enterprise is likely to neither save nor destroy an institution.
Note
1. Table 2 excludes institutions not providing complete information: Boise State,
Boston College, Houston, Michigan State, Pittsburgh, Rice, and Syracuse.  In
addition, it excludes the three service academies because they do not award ath-
letic scholarships, and all students attending the academies receive full scholar-
ship assistance.
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